by Tom McDermott
(This submission of a repost and can be found at its original home here. ED)
I've added a few more things to the Snapshots this week, namely, correlation values. I thought it might be interesting to see how the various Expected Points totals correlate with Margin of Victory and Win Percentage. For those of you unfamiliar with correlation (I know I was until I started getting into all this stat stuff): a correlation of 1.0 is perfect correlation, a correlation of 0.0 is no relationship. As far as Win Percentage, it makes sense that the offense and defense EPA correlations are the same - the way EPA works, for every point gained on offense, there is a point lost on defense (or vice versa). But I was surprised to see the higher Special Teams correlation. I'm not sure this means anything yet - the numbers will most likely regress as the season goes on. But it is interesting to note that the top three teams in terms of Margin of Victory - Denver, Kansas City, and Seattle - also have the top three special teams EPA scores.
Friday, October 18, 2013
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NFL Team snapshots - Week 6 |
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Conversion percentage VS win percentage |
The intent of this study is to see how much more likely strong teams are to convert third or fourth downs compared to weak teams.
In this study I plot various conversion probabilities of 3rd and 4th downs, as a function of team strength (and distance to go). The measure of team strength that I use is the offense’s end of season winning percentage minus the defense’s end of season winning percentage. For the purpose of this study offensive conversion percentage is the number of times a team coverts a third and fourth down divided by the number of attempts to make that conversion. And of course the defensive conversion percentage is the number of times the defense holds on third and fourth down divided by the number of attempts.
So my X and Y variables are:
X =(Offense end of season winning percentage) – (Defense end of season winning percentage)
Y = 1 (successful conversion or TD), 0 (failed conversion)
I know there are much better ways to measure how good an offense or defense is than the end of season winning percentage; but I think this is a good first step. I also think it’s accessible. If a coach wants to get a better idea of how likely they might be to convert in a certain situation the win-loss records might be the first thing they think of. It’s probably how they think of their team strength – “we are a 12 and 4 team”.
I then plot a linear fit from all the 1 and 0 y data points. This means I am assuming that the “true” probability of conversion is a linear function of team W-L record.
I use data from 2002 to 2011 (regular season plus playoffs). I use most of the “normal football” assumptions, but not all. I was slightly more aggressive with time, allowing the 2nd quarter to be counted all the way up to 7 minutes left. The 4th quarter is excluded; all of the 1st and 3rd quarters are included. The plays are only included if the line of scrimmage is between a team’s own 25 and the opponents 20. The score differential is limited to 10 points.
Monday, December 31, 2012
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Should JJ Watt win the MVP award? |
DPOY? Hands Down…
Stat
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JJ Watt (Hou)
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Aldon Smith (SF)
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Von Miller (Den)
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Sacks
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20.5
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1st
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19.5
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2nd
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18.5
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3rd
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Tackles
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69
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50
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55
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Passes Defended
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16
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10th
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1
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2
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Interceptions
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0
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1
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1
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Fumbles Forced
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4
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10th
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3
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22nd
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6
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3rd
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Yards per Pass Attempt (Team)
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6.7
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7th
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6.1
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2nd
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6.4
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5th
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Yards per Rush Attempt (Team)
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4.0
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9th
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3.7
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3rd
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3.6
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2nd
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Stat
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JJ Watt (Hou)
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Aldon Smith (SF)
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Von Miller (Den)
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% adv
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+WPA
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2.96
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1st
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1.04
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1.53
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22nd
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25%
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+EPA
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122.1
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1st
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58.5
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12th
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74.2
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2nd
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65%
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Success Count
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109
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1st
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60
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65
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32nd
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4%
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Tackle Factor
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1.36
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13th
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0.67
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0.71
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-13%
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QB Hits
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43
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1st
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24
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4th
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27
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5th
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34%
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Defensive GWP (Team)
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9th
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2nd
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1st
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-
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Thursday, December 27, 2012
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Wins above average: a statistical nightmare |
by Clark Heins
Introduction: Davis Wylie (pen name of researcher Neil Paine), after much complicated math resulting in each QB‘s stats being “adjusted“ to 2006 levels (through a process known as “translation“, i.e., normalization without standard deviation, converted everything into a final stat “Wins Above Replacement Player” totals in his "The 100 Greatest QBs of the Modern Era” opus which he used to rank QBs.
In football, there is no clearly established formula for determining WAR figures, but Football Outsiders originally estimated that a “Replacement Level” QB was some 13.7% less effective (valuable) than an “average” QB. This percentage was later changed to 13.3% and now rests at 12.5%. All these figures were arbitrary and consisted of some educated guesswork and “value judgments” about “players“ who never existed! It would have been much easier if Wylie had simply used the stat “Wins Above Average” which we can all understand instead of an incomprehensible abstract.
The problem for me was converting these WAR totals to WAA so as to compare with Doug Drinen’s figures in his own WAA opus.
Thursday, December 20, 2012
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Kelly Criterion on 4th down |
It's 4th and 1 from your opponent's 43-yard line. You're up 3 points, and there is 5:16 remaining in the 1st quarter. Should you go for it?
According to the 4th Down Calculator, the answer appears clear. Based on history, there is an estimated 74% chance of converting a 4th down in that scenario. Success yields 0.68 WPA; punting yields 0.61 WPA, and failure yields 0.55 WPA.
These odds tell you that on average, it is a good decision to go for it - just the same as on average you'll make money if you take a bet with those odds and that probability of winning. The "Expected Value" (EV) in this scenario is 3.62. This means that on average, you will gain .0362 WPA by going for it.
However, average doesn't always cut it. Because if it's not certain, you could still lose.
EV enthusiasts often object to that observation, but let's briefly consider an alternate scenario. Pretend that you come across a certain state lottery. For $1, you have a chance of winning $500,000,000 profit. And your chances of winning are 1 in 350,000,000. (Also pretend, for the sake of argument, that there's a new identical lottery every second, and there can't be multiple winners in a round.) Since 500 > 350, those are good odds. Say you can play only once. Should you buy a ticket? What if you could play multiple times, or buy multiple tickets? Should you spend your $5,000 in hard-earned savings on lottery tickets?
Tuesday, December 11, 2012
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1st Down Game Theory: Equilibrium and Exploitable Strategies |
by Mike Sommers
You are faced with a first and 10 on your own 20 yardline, what percentage of the time should you run vs pass? You are on the 40 yardline, what percentage do you run vs pass?
Equilibrium Strategy
This is a problem that is solvable, but it depends upon your objectives. I used average NFL data. The average pass attempt yields about 11.6 yards per catch with a 60.5% completion rate. I rounded this down to 11 yards and 60% completion rate. The average rush attempt yields 4.36 yards (2011 data) I rounded this down to 4 yards. Now if you approach the problem as an “equilibrium” strategy, your goal is actually to reduce the expected effect on the play to no change in score either way. For those familiar with “EP” (expected points), this doesn’t mean that the EP result would be zero, but that over the long run, the EP would not increase or decrease from it’s current levels. That is, no change in expectation of how many points you score, so if your expected points on first and 10 is .34, using an equilibrium strategy, it will remain .34. This is based upon the assumption that in the very long run, the opponents will either adapt or correctly anticipate how to adapt to exploit whatever strategy you come forward with, so the best plan is to just produce “average” results”. I don’t believe this to be true, but the equilibrium strategy is still valid as a “base strategy”.
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When to sacrifice yards for situation |
by Mike Sommers
In "A Response To Brian Burke’s Washington Post Article", I stated that a team would actually be better served coming up short of the first down on 1st down. They would be better off setting up a 2nd and short than 1st and 10, unless they were able to surpass the threshold of 4 yards beyond the first down marker. All of these stats are based on normal teams who typically punt on 4th down. If they planned to go for it more optimally on 4th down, I suspect they would need even more than 4 yards to justify getting a conversion.
Before I go on about the exceptions, I thought it would be useful to get a bit more specific about the situations in which a 1st down conversion is not better than a 2nd and short.
Here is a graph and table of the expected points given the situation. While any 1st and 10 is more favorable than a 2nd and 3, a 2nd and 1 would still be 5 yards better than a 1st and 10. In other words, a 2nd and 1 on your own 29 yard-line is worth more expected points than a 1st and 10 on the 34.



