Are punters getting better?

by Michael Beuoy
Punts
The second most unloved play in the NFL (behind the extra point and, possibly, the Blaine Gabbert pass). When they show a punt on DirecTV's Redzone Channel, Andrew Siciliano actually apologizes, as if it were an errant f-bomb that made it past their tape delay.

The purpose of this post is to show some statistical love for this less glamorous element of the game. Much has been made of the improvement in field goal accuracy over the years. Do we see a similar improvement in punting? What I found is that punters are improving, having added about 4 net yards to their punts over the past ten years.

Data
For this analysis, I used the play by play data Brian Burke posts on his site, looking at seasons 2002 through 2011. From the fields and the play description, I was able to parse out which plays were punts, as well as the following data fields:

• Field Position (where the team punted from)
• Gross Yards (how far the kick went)
• Net Yards
• Result - Did the play end in a touchback, fair catch, downed by the kicking team, muff, return, or block?
• Penalty Yards (if any) assessed on the punt

I only focused on "normal" punts for this analysis, meaning I excluded any punts that were blocked or that somehow resulted in the punting team retaining possession. If a punt had to be rekicked due to penalty, I am only counting the second "official" punt.

Response to Brian Burke's Washington Post article

By Mike Sommers

NB: I have also posted this on a site that I own and occasionally like to post to here.

I recently read Brian Burke’s article describing how coaches should avoid the mentality of trying to set up 3rd and short or 2nd and short and instead try to convert the first down.

It is not that I don’t agree with the article, but I wanted to consider several exceptions to that rule, and in the process came up with some interesting conclusions.

I can illustrate several instances where it’s best to NOT convert on first down. On 3rd however I can only think of 1, and it isn’t provable so much as it is intuitive, but I do have a statistical reference, unfortunately we just don’t have enough information to account for changes AS the play develops.

Brees, Unitas and DiMaggio: 47-Game Streaks Fifty Years Apart, and that 56-Gamer, in Perspective.

by Jim Glass

Drew Brees is collecting well-deserved congratulations on breaking what many have long considered to be the greatest record in pro-football: the streak of 47 consecutive games with a touchdown pass thrown, set by John Unitas during the 1956 through 1960 seasons. In my youth that was often compared to Joe DiMaggio's famous "unbreakable record" 56-game hitting streak in baseball. Last week it was again.

Yet Brees tied-and-broke that record with no fewer than seven TD passes in his last two games, while looking as if he's going to "keep on going and going and going" like that trademarked battery-packed bunny.

So just how "unbreakable" should these records be considered to be?  With all the changes in the game that have occurred during the last 60 years, has Brees' streak really matched Unitas' as being "comparably unlikely," an equal achievement against the odds?  And how do these streaks actually compare to DiMaggio's.   Here's a quick take:

Running the Numbers

How unlikely were the Brees and Unitas 47-game streaks?   To adjust for the different styles of play of different times, a reasonable measure is the probability of the average team of each era (not quarterbacked by Brees or Unitas) scoring at least one touchdown by passing for that many consecutive games. 

Combining Win Probability Model With Live WP Graph

by Tom Baldwin

Andrew Foland provided a solution to this all the way back in January 2011, but it has not been implemented, perhaps because of the complexity of the solution, perhaps simply because nobody has got around to it yet, whichever the case I am here to provide a simple alternative and hope it gets implemented.

The problem is that of combining the prior strength of the teams – the expected difference in performance over a game, let us call this S, with the current state of the game as expressed as a probability, WP. To do this we must consider the total game time, 60 minutes, and the game time remaining, T, in minutes.

Comeback Wins/Losses: The Comeback Kings

by Clark Heins

For every comeback win there is a corresponding comeback loss, and one cannot be considered without the other. A comeback win occurs when the winning team overcomes a deficit at the start of the fourth quarter, at sometime during the fourth quarter or, if necessary, in overtime. Comeback wins have little to do with “comeback opportunities,” as the latter deal specifically with a point spread of eight or fewer points and include games that are tied in the fourth quarter. A comeback win can occur from any deficit and doesn’t deal with ties.

For the purposes of this study, I have made no attempt to credit a QB’s total of comeback wins/losses based upon whether or not he deserves them, as luck always plays a role. My totals are entirely based upon one criteria---who was the QB of record when the comeback win or loss was attained, regardless of how it was attained. As an example, I didn't credit Dan Marino, John Elway, Kerry Collins, and Warren Moon with comeback wins when they were injured during a game-winning drive and replaced by another QB. To do so would ignore the element of luck. Also, my calculations are based upon “QB starts” rather than “games played”, as it would be extremely unfair to use the latter stat for many of the QBs. “QB starts” isn’t perfect either, as several of the QBs mentioned here scored comeback wins or losses in relief.

Spygate: The Effectiveness of Cheating

by Paul Benjamin

Enough time has passed to evaluate the effect of Bill Belichick's cheating. The cheating took place from 2000-2006, and was ended early in 2007, giving 5 years of data since.

The known cheating consisted of two components, as revealed by Eric Mangini. First, the Patriots would tape opponents defensive hand signals. This permitted coaches to correlate the signals with the defensive alignments and figure out what each signal meant. Second, the Patriots used unregistered radio frequencies, so that the second time they played that team the offensive coordinator could watch the defensive signals and choose the perfect play to tell the quarterback. Normally, the referee cuts the registered radio frequency 15 seconds before the snap, so the offensive coordinator cannot communicate with the quarterback after the defense makes its substitutions, but the Patriots were the only team in the league that had radio equipment that could broadcast on multiple frequencies simultaneously. After the referee would cut the registered frequency, the quarterback could still hear the coordinator on the other frequency, so he could be told the defensive alignment he was facing and what play to call.

So the plays and blocking schemes were always perfect ones to exploit each defensive alignment.

Ring Probability Added

by Joe Harris
When arguing a QB's "greatness" people often quote the number of rings a player has as a definitive conclusion to a debate. For example, Dilfer is obviously greater than Marino because he has a ring. And there is nothing else to it. That statement takes the logic a bit further than most people would, but that is essentially how a lot of fans view the world. Whilst I am not a fan of this form of logic, I thought that it would be interesting to look at this concept through the lens of WPA or, more specically, RPA - Ring Probability Added.

Ring Probability Added
The basic idea is to take Brian's WPA stats and weight it depending on the magnitude of the game. For example, in 2004 when New England beat Carolina, Tom Brady essentially did enough to win the game single-handedly with +0.97 WPA. This corresponds to +0.49 RPA - he increased New England's chances of winning the Superbowl by 49%.